

# **Control Systems Under Attack!?**

# ...about the Cyber-Security of modern Control Systems


**Dr. Stefan Lüders** Openlab Summer Student Lectures, July 19<sup>th</sup> 2010





# **CERN** in a Nutshell

"Control Systems Under Attack !?" — Dr. Stefan Lüders — July 19th 2010







# "Control Systems" in a Nutshell

"Control Systems Under Attack !?" — Dr. Stefan Lüders — July 19th 2010

#### **Process Control System (PCS)**



#### **Safety System**








# "Security" in a Nutshell

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#### Security is as high as the weakest link:

- ► Attacker chooses the time, place, method
- ▶ Defender needs to protect against all possible attacks (currently known, and those yet to be discovered)



Security is a system property (not a feature)
Security is a permanent process (not a product)
Security cannot be proven (phase-space-problem)
Security is difficult to achieve, and only to 100%-ε



BTW: Security is *not* a synonym for safety







## **Overview**

"Control Systems Under Attack !?" — Dr. Stefan Lüders — July 19th 2010



# "Control Systems" go "IT"...



Lbut omitted security aspects!



Why worry? The Risk Equation



Mitigation: Today's Gacophony





# "Control Systems" go "IT"...

"Control Systems Under Attack!?" — Dr. Stefan Lüders — July 19th 2010





#### In the past, PCS were

- stand-alone & interconnected using proprietary networks only
- ► accessed via modems, if at all
- using own standards, technologies & means
- ► largely proprietary



"He's the only person who knows how to program our 20 year old PLCs."

## Today, PCS

- ▶ base on custom-of-the-shelf hardware and software ("office IT")
- ▶ are highly inter-connected
- determine & impact widely on our daily life





# **Control Systems for Living**

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...in the electricity sector

...in the oil & gas sector

...in the water & waste sector

...in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry

...in the transport sector

...for production:

► e.g. cars, planes, clothes, news

...in supermarkets

A a scales fridaes

**COBB County Electric, Georgia** 

Middle European Raw Oil, Czech Republic

**Athens Water Supply & Sewage** 

Merck Sharp & Dohme, Ireland

**CCTV Control Room, UK** 

**Reuters TV Master Control Room** 

**CERN Control Centre** 




In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks & today's "terroristic" fears:

Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)



# (R)Evolution: The Past


"Control Systems Under Attack !?" — Dr. Stefan Lüders — July 19th 2010








# (R)Evolution: Today





# This is how PCS can look like

"Control Systems Under Attack !?" — Dr. Stefan Lüders — July 19th 2010





## **Standard Hard and Software**

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bus/ter, ope & tel



# **Standard Security Risks**

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JOULDUS/TEP, OPE & Telnet PES & Lap Shared Accounts & Passwor



# PCS omitted security aspects!

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- ► hidden ("security through obscurity")
- ► never a real concern
- ▶ a target for nerds



#### Today,

- ➤ Same "office IT"-risks inherent for PCS
- Same "office IT"-attackers targeting PCS

#### But also, today,

▶ many entities are paranoid on this– in particular after 9/11







# "Controls" is *not* IT! (1)

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	"Office IT"	"Controls"
System Life Cycle	3 – 5 years	5 – 20 years
Availability	scheduled interventions OK	24h / 7d / 365d
Confidentiality	high	low
Time Criticality	delays tolerated	critical
Security Knowledge	exists	usually low
Intrusion detection	standard	no signatures
DHCP	standard	Fixed IPs in hardware configurations
Usage of wireless	frequent	increasing use



# "Controls" is not IT! (2)

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# Why worry? The Risk Equation

"Control Systems Under Attack!?" — Dr. Stefan Lüders — July 19th 2010







# RISK = Threat

- × Vulnerability
- × Fonsequence





## Who is the threat?

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#### Attacks performed by...

- ► Trojans, viruses, worms, ...
- Disgruntled (ex-)employees or saboteurs
- Attackers and terrorists (step-by-step instructions on BlackHat conferences; freeware hacking tools for "Script Kiddies")

#### Lack of robustness & lots of stupidity

- ► Mal-configured or broken devices flood the network
- Developer / operator "finger trouble"

#### Lack of procedures

- ► Flawed updates or patches provided by third parties
- Inappropriate test & maintenance rules / procedures





# Damage by Viruses & Worms?

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#### 2003/08/11: W32.Blaster.Worm

'Sinister' Integral Energy virus outbreak a threat to power grid

ASHER MOSES October 1, 2009

Linux saves Aussie electrical grid

A virus outbreak is wreaking havoc Open sauce to the rescue computer network, forcing it to rebu By Nick Farrell

Zotob, PnP Worms Slam 13 DaimlerChrysler

There are 0 user comments on this Security story.

**Plants** 

**EWEEK**.com

the INQUIRER

have saved an Australian power supply m network got infected with a virue

Slamm S Kevin Pou By: Paul F. Roberts Article Rating:ជំជំជំជំជំ / 0 Share This Article

disable

The latest worm attacks, exploiting holes in the Wir

The bre; causing grief to major

5-inch h permitte

Plug and Play service, are corporations.

analog b A round of Internet worm inf the nucl knocked 13 of DaimlerChrys some 50,000 auto workers as infected Microsoft Windows s spokesperson told eWEEK.



Delicious V Addictive Tech News Served Daily

Security Focus

#### Hospital Equipment Infected with Conficker

by Bill Lindner on 20090428 @ 02:13PM EST | google it | send to friends Filed under Security | (related terms: conficker/downadup worm, hospitals, computers infected, internet, critical)





# Damage by Insiders?

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software

Duo deny L The Hollywoo By John Leyd

Posted in Enterpresent Free whitepaper

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
A pair of Los A signals to disru

Gabriel Murillo, access of a col accused of fou LA's Automate commands to r



new windows 0-day targets SCADA, threatens us all

By alberg hacks



Over the past few days, reports of a new attack against Windows based

SCADA systems (the computer software which control power plants, water treatment facilities and other parts of the critical infrastructure) have been making the rounds of the security blogosphere. While the payload carried in the new attacks is aimed specifically at these vital control systems (specifically a system called Siemens SCADA WinCC + S7), the vulnerability used to deliver it looks

kers

Add comments

could make

contractor urt with on oil-rig pite for not the other

charge, though, fortunately, no leaks.

they



# Damage by Attacker? (1)

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## CIA slipped bugs to Soviets

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. Memoir recounts Cold V TECHNOLOGY | APRIL 8, 2009 Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated By Spies By David E. Hoffman Article Video Comments (145) washingtonpost updated 12:13 a.m. ET Feb. 27, 20 Print + Text -Russia welcomes hack attacks

Script Kiddies cut teeth hijacking critical in

Report: Cyber Attacks Caused Power Outages in Brazil By Thomas C Greene in Washington DC • G

Posted in Business, 27th April 2000 12:25 GMT

Free whitepaper - Taking control of your data demons

that Gazprom, a state-run gas utility, came unde

The intruders succeeded in defeating the comp

reported. The C name it. The Inti

crime. ®

Electrical blackouts impacting millions of people in Brazil in 2005 and Malicious hack attacks are on the rise in Russia 2007 were caused by hackers targeting control systems, according to

By Kevin Poulsen Movember 7, 2009 | 12:55 am | Categories: Cybarmageddon!

Interfax news service reports. Most spectacular the CBS news magazine 60 Minutes.

Gazprom is the world's largest natural gas prod (Update: Brazilian Blackout Traced to

controlling gas pipelines, Interior Ministry spoke In a show set to air Sunday night, CBS

The flow of natural and was upday the control of Espirito Santo in 2007 on a back attack

InTech

#### 2 November 2006

#### Hackers hit Pennsylvania water system

A foreign hacker who penetrated security at a Harrisburg, Pa., water filtering plant is under investigation for planting malicious software capable of affecting the plant's water treatment operations, the FBI said.

The hacker did not attempt to take control of the system; instead the intruder tried to use the system as its own distribution system for e-mails or pirated software, officials said

st surfaced last year, based on led to identify any country or the nonth, former cybersecurity czar ime, but didn't go into details.



WIRED



# Damage by Attacker? (2)

"Control Systems Under Attack !?" — Dr. Stefan Lüders — July 19th 2010

May 7, 2009 3:59 PM PDT

## Report: Hackers broke into FAA air traffic control





# No Damage, yet? (1)

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"....penetration test locked up the not able to send gas through its;

- Sandia National Labs, US [2005]

Sources: Staged cyber attack Sources: Staged cyber attack reveals vulnerability in power grid



FAA: Boeing's New 787 May Be Vulnerable to WIRED

Hacker Attack

Security

#### America's Hackable Backbone

Andy Greenberg, 08.22.07, 6:00 PM ET

#### TVA Power Plants Vulnerable to Cyber A

Regulators Want Authority to Require Security Upgrades Ir

By Brian I Safety

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Wednesd: You are in: Home > Safety > News Article

SOURCE: Air Transport Intelligence news

06/05/09

The Tenn public po could sab than 8.7 r

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Had

The repor panel on today from gaining ac implemen US air traffic exposed to "serious

attacks

By John Croft

Federal investigators were able to hack into an air traffi and traffic flow management computers as part of a wi the US FAA's air traffic control infrastructure.

The audit results, published 4 May by the Transportation General (OIG), concluded that "web applications used in are not properly secured to prevent attacks or unauthor

The Boeing 787 Dreamliner aircraft makes its public debut July 8, 2007, amidst employees and outside the Boeing assembly plant in Everett, Washington. Photo: Robert Sorbo / Corbis

Boeing's new 787 Dreamliner passenger jet may have a serious security vulnerability in its onboard computer networks that could allow passengers to access the plane's control systems, according to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration.





# No Damage, yet? (2)

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#### Hole Found in Protocol Handling Vital National Infrastructure

7 May 2008, 14:37

March 25, 2007

Systems that control dams, oil refineries, railroads power plants have a vulnerability that could cause takeover, according to a recent research report.

a remote connection, a GPRS or ADSL router is needed at the PLC site, which bridge between the PLC LAN (Local Network) and the WWAN or WAN (Intern

remote iPhone or iPod Touch will have access to. " (Source: Section 4.1 in the

Route

WAN IP: myname.dyndns.org

LOCAL IP: 192.168.1.1

Local Network





#### Secure SCADA System


Realtime software you

#### Denial of service hole in WonderWare SCADA systems



S7 PLCs.

LOCAL IF: 192.100.1.40






"I designed a program that allows me to run the entire plant from my computer. By the way, how's the weather back there?





# Damage due to Lack of Procedures?

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United States, FAA spokeswoman Kathleen


Bergen said.





# **No Damage at CERN**

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# **Smart Meters: Risk & Hype**

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#### **Use case:**

- Measuring your consumption at home
- ▶ Online with the grid: Optimizing the power usage
- Publicly accessible, off-the-shelf, open networks

#### Risks:

- Exploitation of meter vulnerabilities: registration process, firmware, data, ...
- Loss of confidentiality: customer data available to others
- Loss of integrity: manipulation of reading data
- Loss of availability: data not available in a timely manner
- Misuse as attack platform

# Power Grid Is Found Susceptible to Cyberattack

Robert McMillan, IDG News Service

Saturday, March 21, 2009 12:10 PM PDT

An emerging network of intelligent power switches, called the Smart Grid, could be taken down by a cyberattack, according to researchers with IOActive, a Seattle security consultancy.

IOActive researchers have spent the past year testing Smart Grid devices for security vulnerabilities and have discovered a number of flaws that could







# Mitigation: Today's Cacophony

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# Using "office"-IT *must* also mean using "office"-security technology":

- ► Apply same security measures
- ► Inherent differences need to be taken care of separately
- ► Defence-in-Depth as a basis
- ► Influence you vendor !!!

#### Too many stakeholders:

- ► A cacophony in standards & guidelines
- ► A cacophony in interest
- ► No *real* directions by legislators






# **Ground Rules for Cyber-Security**

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#### "Defence-in-Depth" protection on every layer:

device/hardware, firmware/operating systems/network protocols, software/applications, user/integrator/developer






# **Network Segregation**

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# Different networks for different purposes:

- ➤ ...for accelerator operations
- ▶ ...and for experiments
- ► Campus network for office comput
- ► Additional protective measures where needed ("VPNs", ACLs, ...)



#### **Restrictions on Controls Networks:**

- ► Assignment of responsibilities and usage of authorization procedures
- ▶ No Internet, no (GPRS) modems, no wireless access points or laptops
- Controlled inter-communication between networks
- ► Blocked incoming emails & control over visible web pages
- ► Controlled remote access, e.g. for maintenance, development & testing
- ► Traffic monitoring & intrusion detection at the gates



# Patch, Patch, Patch !!!

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```
220-<<<<<>>=< Hared by A 0n3 >==<>>>>>
220 - Pessing flexibility, shoots as, , shoots as, , shoots as, , shoots as, ,
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220-| Cus Welcome to this fine stro
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220-1
22( - O ) Current throughut: 10 (0)0 11b/se
220-|Loca Space For Rent: 5858.57 Mb
220 - | Anti-virus software
220-| Running: 0 days, 10 hours, 31
220- Users Connected: 1 Total: 15
220-1
220<sup>Aoo</sup>Hø,,,,ønoAcoHø,,,ønocAcoHø,,,,ønooAcoScilloscopes
                                                               LHC
```



# **Control (Remote) Access**

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## Following "Rule of Least Privilege":

- Restricting all access to minimum
- Ensuring traceability (who, when, from where
- Keeping passwords secret

#### ...for all assets:

- Control PCs & operating systems
- SCADA applications & user interfaces
- Procedures, documentation, etc.

#### "Role Based Access Control" for op's:

- Reduction of "shared" accounts
- Full control for the shift leader of operations
- Multi-factor authentication for critical assets (planned)



```
// If same day then simple querie

if (($StartDay == $EndDay)&& ($StartMonth == $EndMont)
$DateClause = "WHERE PROCESSINGDAY = TO_DATE('$Start)
}
else (
$DateClause = "WHERE PROCESSINGDAY BETWEEN TO_DATE('!
$DateClause .="AND TO_DATE('$EndDay-$EndMonth-$EndYe(')
}

// do the grant and show tables
$user =
$pass =
$Sdb = "
$db_conn = ocilogon($user, $pass, $db);

$gstring = "Select sum(NROFRECORDS), execluster, jobstan
$qstring .= $DateClause;
```





# **Review Development Life-Cycle**

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# Reviewing procedures As Beeing 777 uses similar technologies

 ...development of hardware & applications
 to Process Control Systems



- ...system testing
- ➤ ...deployment
- ...operations
- ...maintenance & bug fixing
- ► Use of software versioning systems, configuration management integration frameworks (CWS, SVN) Git)



#### **Protecting operations**

- ► Keeping development separated from operations (eventually debugging might need access to full accelerator hardware)
- ► Avoiding driline changes for the sake of safe operations:
  - Online changes must be authorized by the shift leader for operations

www.fotn.in






### **Understand the Risks**

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# PLCs and other controls devices are completely unprotected:

► No firewall, no anti-virus, nothing



#### **Thorough Risk Assessment:**

- ► Building asset inventory
- ► Understanding dependencies
- Running vulnerability tools on everything (e.g. PLCs, control PCs, SCADA, data historians, Web servers)
- ▶ Determination of weaknesses & risks
- ➤ Applying "Security Baselines" i.e. a contract on security with recommendations for configuration settings, protective means, procedures & training





# **Deepen Collaboration**

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#### **Bringing together experts:**

- Control system experts know their systems by heart – but IT concepts ?
- IT people often don't know controlsbut IT security they do
- Win mutual trust & get their buy-in
- Gain synergy effects



#### Training of users and raise awareness

#### Looking outside!

- Following the basic standards of Industry
- Establishing contacts inside the HEP communit with governments, with industry, ...
- Spread the word to the vendors, and...



Utilisez les systèmes d'exploitation fournis par le département IT du CERN : ils sont configurés de manière sûre et mis à jour automatiquement pour vous.

Soyez prudent lorsque vous naviguez sur le Web: ne clique pas sur des liens suspects et n'installez pas de plug-in douteux.

Protégez vos mots de passe:

in els partagez jamais prenez garde
au phishing technique qu'utilisent les
escrocs en ligne pour voler votre mot
de passe; ne les réutilisez pes (utilisez
des mots de passe différentes) pour des
applications différentes); ne les tapez
pas sur des ordinateurs ou des sites Web
suspects.

Protégez votre ordinateur privé: utilisez l'antivirus du CERN; appliquez les mises à jour logicielles; n'installez pas de logiciels douteux.

Protégez vos fichiers et données : limitez l'accès à vos documents et répertoires; appliquez le principe du droit d'accès minimal.

Suivez les règles informatiques du CERN : respectez le droit d'auteur n'utilisez pas de logiciels non-autorisés; consultez http://cem.ch/ComputingRules

Demandez conseil : l'équipe de sécurité informatique vous réposes des cours de formation, des analyses de codes logiciels, des balayages Web ou serveur etc., et est là pour vous aider : contactez

Computer.Security@cern.ch ou consultez http://cern.ch/Computer.Security





# (Too) Many Standards...?

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#### "Good Practice Guidelines Parts 1-7"

U.K. Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) http://www.cpni.gov.uk/Products/guidelines.aspx

#### "Manufacturing and Control Systems Security"

ANSI/ISA SP99 TR99.00.01-04 http://www.isa.org/MSTemplate.cfm?MicrositeID=988&CommitteeID=6821

#### "Guide to SCADA and Industrial Control Systems Security"

NIST SP800-82

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-82/draft sp800-82-fpd.pdf

#### "Critical Infrastructure Protection CIP-002 to CIP-009"

U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) <a href="http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=2%7C20">http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=2%7C20</a>

#### "Information Technology — Security Techniques"

ISO/IEC 27001:2005 and following

#### Lot's of money dumped (wasted?) to have better CIP...

The figure of the first special and the first special for the firs



## Some more cooks...

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**Government Initiatives:** 











**Global Key Players:** 























**Mixed Communities:** 











# Today's only (?) regulation

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## NST

National Institute of Standards and Technology

NIST 800-53 & 53A

- ► Help to identify,

  control, mitigate risks

  to information and information systems
- Recommendations and guidelines for selecting and specifying safeguards & countermeasures
- ► Foundation for risk assessment

...how does this apply to PCS (e.g. NIST SP800-82)?

#### FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT ACT

IMPLEMENTING SECURITY STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES

FIPS 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems, is a mandatory, non-waiverable standard developed in response to the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002. To comply with the federal standard, agencies must first determine the security category of their information system in accordance with the provisions of FIPS 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems, and then apply the appropriate set of baseline security controls in NIST Special Publication 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems. Agencies have flexibility in applying the baseline security controls in accordance with the tailoring guidance provided in Special Publication 800-53.

the executive controls to execute allowed to fit their mission recognized the baseline security Controls for Federal Information Systems. Agencies have flexibility in applying the baseline security controls in accordance with the tailoring guidance provided in Special Publication 800-53. This allows agencies to adjust the security controls to more closely fit their mission requirements and operational environments.

The combination of FIPS 200 and NIST Special Publication 800-53 requires a foundational level of security for all federal information and information systems (other than national security information and information systems). The agency's risk assessment validates the security control set by determining if any additional controls are needed to protect agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency assets, or individuals. The resulting set of security controls establishes a level of "security due diligence" for federal agencies and their contractors.

In addition to the security requirements established by FISMA, there may also be specific security requirements in different business areas within agencies that are governed by other laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, or associated governing documents, (e.g., the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996, or OMB Circular A-127 on Financial Management Systems). These requirements may not be equivalent to the security requirements and implementing security controls required by FISMA or may enhance or further refine the security requirements and security controls. It is important that agency officials (including authorizing officials, chief information officers, senior agency information security officers, information system owners, information system security officers, and acquisition authorities) take steps to help ensure that: (i) all appropriate security requirements are addressed in agency acquisitions of information systems and information system services; and (ii) all necessary security controls are implemented in agency information systems when determining the tailored and supplemented control baselines described in this publication.

See http://csrc.nist.gov/sec-cert/ca-compliance.html for additional information on compliance.





# **Summary**

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# "Control Systems" go "IT"...



Lbut omitted security aspects!



Why worry? The Risk Equation



Mitigation: Today's Gacophony

